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Abstract—Vehicles become more vulnerable to remote attack-
ers in modern days due to their increasing connectivity and
range of functionality. Such increased attack vectors enable
adversaries to access a vehicle Electronic Control Unit (ECU).
As of today in-vehicle access can cause drastic consequences,
because the most commonly used in-vehicle bus technology, the
Controller Area Network (CAN), lacks sender identification.
With low limits on bandwidth and payload, as well as resource
constrains on hardware, usage of cryptographic measures is
limited. As an alternative, sender identification methods were
presented, identifying the sending ECU on the basis of its analog
message signal. While prior works showed promising results on
the security and feasibility for those approaches, the potential
changes in signals over a vehicle’s lifetime have only been partly
addressed. This paper closes this gap. We conduct a four months
measurement campaign containing more than 80,000 frames from
a real vehicle. The data reflects different driving situations,
different seasons and weather conditions, a 19-week break, and a
car repair altering the physical CAN properties. We demonstrate
the impact of temperature dependencies, analyze the signal
changes and define strategies for their handling. In the evaluation,
the identification rate can be increased from 91.23 % to 99.98 %
by a targeted updating of the system parameters. At the same
time, the detection of intrusions can be improved from 76.83 %
to 99.74 %, while no false positives occured during evaluation.
Lastly, we show how to increase the overall performance of such
systems by double monitoring the bus at different positions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern vehicles have an increasing amount of functions
and services with an increasing amount of connectivity to their
environment [1], [2], [3], [4]. Local wireless communication
uses standards like Bluetooth or WiFi, but also cellular radio
is utilized to communicate with cloud systems. The additional
functionalities and services also open up new attack vectors,
all without requiring physical access at any time to vehi-
cles [5], [6]. By demonstrating vulnerabilities on such vehicles,
numerous publications show that this threat is real [7], [8],
[9]. The most famous example in this respect is the attack
on the Jeep Cherokee [10]. Using a wireless connection, the
researchers were able to manipulate safety-critical functions
such as braking and steering. That a vulnerability in an ECU
can be exploited in such a way is primarily due to the lack of
security mechanisms [2] in the most commonly used standard
for internal vehicle communication, the CAN [11]. Once an
attacker has acquired access to the vehicle communication,
he can potentially control numerous vehicular functions. Even
though the attack on the Jeep dates back several years, the
current work of Tencent Keen Security Lab shows that these
dangers still exist in more modern vehicles [12], [13]. The
team discovered several vulnerabilities in different BMW
models that allow access to the CAN via wireless connection.
The general use of cryptographic measures to secure the
in-vehicle communication is limited due to the constrained
resources of the ECUs, the low bandwidth and payload per
CAN message [14], [15], [16], [17]. Therefore, alternative
approaches have been presented in the past which allow to
identify the sender of a CAN message based on physical
characteristics of its analog signal [18], [19], [20], [21], [17].
In this regard, the general idea is to extract a fingerprint
from a measured signal, which can then be compared with
known patterns to determine the sending ECU. Since the in-
vehicle communication is of static nature, authorization of an
identified ECU to send a message can be validated. Besides
detection of forged frames, these techniques can also enrich
comprehensive Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) with rele-
vant sender information [2], [22]. Such systems can be roughly
separated into two groups: signature-based systems which
detect intrusions based on predefined rules and anomaly-based
systems which are capable of detecting new attacks based on
irregularities in the communication.
A. Contribution
Regardless of the approach of signal characteristic-based
sender identification, the related work on this topic pertain
roughly the same concept. However, there are open questions
regarding stability during operation [18], [19], [20] which are
answered in a limited extent [21], [17]. This work closes this
gap. We clarify the issues of signal characteristic stability
in the course of system operation and present more precise
possibilities to deal with potential changes during runtime. For
a general evaluation of the long-term deviations of the signals,
a method for calculating the signal deviation is introduced
and used for the analysis. This allows a representation of the
temperature dependence as well as a general behavior of the
signals during operation of the vehicle. Furthermore, different
learning strategies for the creation of the initial model and a
mechanism for the recognition of changes and the adaptation
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of the model to them were evaluated. While in Scission [17]
the update mechanism is only explained very briefly, with this
work we specify its implementation and evaluate its perfor-
mance with regard to different signal variations. In addition,
this work shows that the robustness of the fingerprinting tech-
niques can be increased by using several measurement points.
Therefore, the approach for sender identification and intrusion
detection, Scission [17], is used during the evaluation of this
work. For the experiments, several data sets were gathered,
which were recorded at different seasons and temperatures
as well as at different conditions of the vehicle. In total,
the data contains more than 80,000 frames, collected over a
period of more than 4 months. The data also includes a 19-
week break during which signal-changing repairs were made
to the vehicle. Through the methods presented in this paper
we achieve an identification rate of over 99.9 %, an attack
detection rate of 99.7 % as well as zero false positives and
thus keep the performance in comparison to Scission [17] also
with changes of the signals.
B. Organization of the Paper
After the introduction in Section I, Section II provides back-
ground information on the CAN, as well as reasons for the
variation of the signal characteristics. In addition, this section
provides an overview of the sender identification and intrusion
detection approach used in this paper, as well as an explanation
of the significance of changes of input parameters. In Sec-
tion III, the actual signal changes are examined independently
of the employed identification procedure. This includes the
calculation as well as the analysis of signal deviations based
on data of a real vehicle. Subsequently, the evaluation in Sec-
tion IV follows with regard to robustness and performance of
different strategies for handling signal changes in combination
with sender identification. After having presented the results
of the investigations, Section V addresses the analysis and
evaluation of the existing sender identification mechanisms
with regard to the handling of changes. We conclude the paper
in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Controller Area Network
Representing an often used bus system, the CAN [11]
enables data exchange of vehicular ECUs in a broadcasting
communication. It was designed that transmitted messages
contain an unique identifier to characterize each message.
Further, CAN is built as a multi-master network, causing that
several control units may try to initiate a data transmission at
the same time. In this case, the arbitration process determines
which ECU is entitled to occupy the bus based on the
priority of the message to be sent, which in turn is defined
by its identifier. On a physical level, the transmission takes
place over two twisted wires, CAN high and low, which are
connected to the transceiver of each ECU and are terminated
at the ends with 120Ω. Logical bits are transmitted over
those two wires by their differential voltage. In simplified
terms, this procedure is described in the following. During
the transmission of a logical one, both channels rest at a
voltage of 2.5 V resulting in a difference of 0 V. Should a
zero bit be transmitted, CAN high is driven towards 3.5 V
whereas CAN low is pulled to 1.5 V, leading to the fact that
a logical zero is represented by 2 V in the differential signal.
However, the theoretical target voltage of 2 V and the signal
shape during bit transitions slightly differ between the ECUs,
even though they share the same bus and are powered by the
same 12 V/24 V battery. In order to derive the ECU operation
voltage of 5 V and to prevent fluctuations of the same, voltage
regulators are brought into operation. Due to manufacturer-
related imperfections of electronic components built in both
the regulators and the transceivers, small variations of the
voltage during transmission are likely to happen for each
ECU [23]. The same applies to the grounding voltage [24],
which may vary due to external influences like temperature
or humidity. Additionally, the resulting voltage on the wire
is affected by reflections of the power of the transmitted
signal [25]. These occur due to cable characteristics like
channel length and bus termination. To summarize, all the
aforementioned factors have an impact on both the resulting
voltage level during the transmission of a zero bit and the
shape of the transitions between bits of opposed values.
B. Scission
Existing differences of voltage characteristics can be ex-
ploited to realize an authentication mechanism for the con-
nected ECUs. An approach, which realizes this idea to provide
security for the CAN is called Scission [17]. By utilizing ma-
chine learning techniques to differentiate the voltage variations
of each ECU, the system can draw conclusions on the origin
of a transmitted CAN message. For this purpose, Scission ini-
tiates its authentication procedure with the sampling of voltage
values during the transmission of a CAN message as visualized
in Figure 1. Afterwards, the sampled signal is separated into
three different groups, from which the first group contains
all rising edges which occurred during the transition from a
logical one to a zero within the data field of the respective
message. Further, the second group holds the voltage values
during the transmission of a logical zero, whereas the last
group, analogously to the first, stores all falling edges. To
improve the performance of machine learning approaches in
general, it is advised to transform the data into meaningful
representations, called features. Regarding Scission, a variety
of different features, both in the time and frequency domain,
are determined based on the voltage samples contained in the
three aforementioned groups. With the help of this calculated
feature set and an appropriate machine learning approach, a
model of the mapping between available control units and their
individual voltage characteristics can be established. Since in
this context, the Logistic Regression is a simple yet powerful
machine learning approach and also provides great capabilities
to adapt an already established model, it was chosen for the
implementation in Scission. This adaption capability is an
especially important basis for the update procedure described
in Section III-C. To realize the previously mentioned sender
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Fig. 1: General procedure of the intrusion detection system Scission [17].
identification, the model, which in the case of the Logistic
Regression consists of as many classifiers as connected ECUs,
is used during the classification to determine the probability
of each ECU being the origin of the message. Here, the ECU
whose classifier yielded the highest probability is chosen to be
the initiator of the transmission. In order to increase the system
robustness and simultaneously decrease false alarms in case
of minor uncertainties, Scission implements two thresholds
to make a final decision on intrusions. In this context, a
transmission is classified as authorized, when the classifier of
the eligible control unit crosses a lower probability threshold
which is defined in advance. Only if the lower threshold is un-
dercut by the probability of the theoretically authorized ECU
and an upper threshold exceeded for any other probability,
an adversarial transmission originating from an unauthorized
control unit is declared. In every other case, the message is
marked as suspicious.
C. Concept Drift
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Fig. 2: Different kinds of concept drift [26].
Machine learning approaches are capable of determining
the relationship between structures in the provided training
data and their target values. In this process, it is generally
assumed that the characteristics of the provided data during
the model establishment phase do not change over the period
of system utilization. However, in a realistic environment this
assumption cannot be met as external influences dynamically
change the distribution of the underlying data. This shift in
either the data characteristics or the target value is also referred
to as concept drift. As a direct consequence of this drift,
the classification performance of the system deteriorates on
account of an outdated model. Here, the extent of performance
loss further depends on the severity and type of the respective
drift. A differentiation can be made between an abrupt change
of the distribution or an incremental drift which can be
recognized and on which the system can react to. The authors
of [26] comprehensively address the topic of concept drifts,
whereas Figure 2 briefly illustrates both abrupt and incremental
changes. In the automotive area, material wear and temperature
fluctuations may be the cause for the later drift, whereas
modifications on either the communication network or the
power supply could depict a reason for abrupt voltage changes.
Therefore, to maintain a good classification performance, the
model either has to be adapted accordingly or it has to be
rebuilt from scratch with present data.
III. SIGNAL CHARACTERISTIC ANALYSIS
This section addresses the analysis of changes in voltage
characteristics which were observed over a longer period of
time. For this purpose, the recorded data sets utilized for
this analysis are presented first. Based on this data and the
contained CAN messages, the analytical approach is described
subsequently with which the individual data sets and changes
are measured. In this respect, the results of the analysis are also
presented. Finally, the update procedure is introduced which
is used to adapt and update the machine learning model for
the succeeding evaluation.
A. Data Sets
The data used for the analysis is taken from a Fiat 500, the
vehicle which was also used in the evaluation of Scission [17].
In this vehicle, a total of six ECUs communicate over the
considered CAN bus, whereby transmitted messages were
recorded via a PicoScope 4227 Digital Storage Oscilloscope
(DSO) using the on-board diagnostics (OBD)-II port in the
front of the car. Overall, two data sets were recorded in this
setup, one of them during the summer and the other in winter.
TABLE I: Data sets for the evaluation on signal robustness.
Data Set 1 - Summer
Part Frames Temp. Break Properties
Part 1 5977 25◦C
(77◦F)
3 min Switched off and connected
to external battery
Part 2 4645 25◦C
(77◦F)
15 min Switched off
Part 3 6823 32◦C
(89.6◦F)
225
min
Switched on and follow-
ing cooling down at 23◦C
(73.4◦F)
Part 4 4950 36◦C
(96.8◦F)
132
days
Switched off and on with in-
cluding motor start
Data Set 2 - Winter
Part Frames Temp. Break Electrical Consumers
Part 1 5424 10◦C
(50◦F)
20 hrs Wipers, turn signals and
headlights
Part 2 6794 ∼5◦C
(41◦F)
106
min
Window lifters, turn signals,
headlights and start-stop sys-
tem
Part 3 5503 " 95 min "
Part 4 6519 " 22 hrs "
Part 5 5937 5◦C
(41◦F)
91 min "
Part 6 6748 " 18 hrs "
Part 7 6413 2◦C
(35.6◦F)
245
min
Heating and start-stop sys-
tem
Part 8 6324 " 20 hrs "
Part 9 6590 0◦C
(32◦F)
- Start-stop system
Thus a total temperature range between 0◦C (32◦F) and 36◦C
(96.8◦F) is considered.
The first data set consists of four parts, whereby three of
them were already used for the evaluation of Scission. The
first part contains 5977 frames in total, recorded while the
vehicle was switched off and connected to an external battery
pack. During this recording, the ambient temperature was
approx. 25◦C (77◦F), which is similar to the temperature in
the course of the second part acquisition, where 4645 frames
were recorded. Here, the vehicle was also switched off and
in cold condition, but without having the additional battery
pack connected. The third part of the first data set consists of
6823 frames and was recorded during a 30 minutes long trip at
a temperature of 32◦C (89.6◦F). Afterwards, the vehicle was
parked in a garage at approx. 23◦C (73.4◦F) for three hours
with the intention to cool down the vehicular components. For
the recording of the fourth part, consisting of 4950 frames, the
switched off vehicle was measured at first and subsequently
driven for about 20 minutes at 36◦C (96.8◦F). In total, the first
data set comprises 22,395 CAN frames and contains signals
from a period of 5 hours and 15 minutes at a temperature
range between 23◦C (73.4◦F) and 36◦C (96.8◦F).
The second data set contains a total of nine journeys over a
period of five days, each lasting around 15 minutes on average.
The ambient temperatures were in the range of 10◦C (50◦F)
on the first measuring day and just below 0◦C (32◦F) on the
last. Concerning the weather conditions during the recording
period, the first day was for the most part rainy, on the
second day it was still humid, while from the third day on the
environment was dry. These conditions facilitate our intention
to use various electrical consumers, such as windscreen wipers,
turn signals, lights, window regulators, heating, etc. during
all journeys in order to record a potential impact on the
voltage characteristics. In addition, the measurements of the
second data set include several vehicle starts, since the start-
stop system was activated during the trips. Altogether a total
of 54,933 frames were recorded during these nine trips. A
summarized overview of both data sets which are used for the
evaluation of this work is given in Table I.
Between these two data sets lies a period of 19 weeks
during which the vehicle was used by colleagues. Further, a
maintenance was carried out in this time, where the radiator
fan and the battery of the Fiat were replaced. Finally, it must
also be noted that the measurement setup could not be 100%
identical for both data sets since it had to be removed from
the car during this time.
B. Signal Analysis
a) Signal Deviation Calculation: Based on the intro-
duced data set in the previous section, we now compare the
voltage deviations between the recorded CAN messages of all
individual sets, in order to get a feel for the change of voltage
characteristics over a longer period of time. To accomplish
this intention, a method is required to compare individual
messages which additionally operates independently of the
transmitted data. The foundation for this method is taken from
the preprocessing step of the former presented Scission [17]
approach. In order to recall this step, Scission divides the
sampled signal during the data transmission into three groups
g containing rising (g = 1) and falling edges (g = 3), as
well as constant voltage levels during zero bit transmissions
(g = 2). Note that in this section the classification and
intrusion detection of Scission is not utilized but rather its
approach to separate the voltage samples is taken up. Figure 4a
shows an exemplary group for g = 1 containing K = 8
rising edges. Here, each rising edge, as well as a constant
level or falling edge, is referred to as symbol. Taking this into
consideration, the k-th symbol of a frame m coming from an
ECU labeled with e can be defined by
S
g,(e,m)
k = (x1, ..., xl) (1)
where, xi, i ∈ {1, .., l} are the individual voltage values of
the symbol, l their quantity per symbol and g ∈ {1, 2, 3} the
respective group. Hence, with the help of Equation 1 we can
also define a group Gg,(e,m) of a frame m coming from ECU
e by
Gg,(e,m) =
K⋃
k=0
S
g,(e,m)
k (2)
with K being the number of symbols contained in the frame
m in respect to the group g ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Here, it has to
be noted that the data transmitted by the individual frames
differs, leading to a varying number of bit transitions and thus
to a different amount of symbols K per group g and frame
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m. Therefore, the first step of comparing individual messages
depicts the creation of an average symbol S
g,(e,m)
for each
group Gg,(e,m) and frame m in respect to g ∈ {1, 2, 3}, like
shown in Figure 4b. To achieve this, the samples are averaged
over all K symbols in Gg,(e,m) calculated by
S
g,(e,m)
= (
1
K
K∑
k=0
S
g,(e,m)
k [i] | ∀i ∈ {1, ..., l}). (3)
For the next step of the signal changes evaluation we use
an adapted variant of the approach presented by Murvay and
Groza [18]. First, a so-called template Sˆg,e is created for each
of the three groups g per ECU e by using the average symbols
S
g,(e,m)
of M recorded messages originating from it. Utilizing
Equation 3 and a number M of different frames, the template
can be calculated by
Sˆg,e = (
1
M
M∑
m=0
S
g,(e,m)
[i] | ∀i ∈ {1, ..., l}). (4)
It can be said that a template is the average of several pre-
viously mentioned average symbols. The following frames of
both data sets are then compared with the determined template.
This is achieved by calculating the average of the percentage
difference per sample of the template and the average symbol
of the message to be evaluated. Mathematically, this signal
deviation SDg,(e,t) of a data set frame t originating from ECU
e in respect to the group g can be expressed by
SDg,(e,t) = 1−
l∑
i=0
S
g,(e,t)
[i]
Sˆg,e[i]
(5)
By calculating these deviations quotients over the course of
the available data set, the concept drift captured over a longer
period of time can now be analyzed.
b) Concept Drift Analysis: The DSO used to sample the
CAN channel during data transmission has a sampling rate
of 125 MS/s, while Scission and its preprocessing step target
a rate of 20 MS/s. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce the
data points of all recorded signals by a factor of 3 by removing
intermediate samples. Afterwards, a template was created from
M = 20 messages per ECU following the procedure described
in the previous paragraph and used to calculate the voltage
deviation of the remaining frames. The general course of the
signal deviation for every ECU of the Fiat 500 is visualized in
Figure 3. For the analysis we use the deviations of the rising
edges, since these contain the most useful information for
differentiation of the ECUs [17]. Since the number of CAN
frames per ECU and trip differs from each other, the figure
shows the deviation of 200 frames per ECU and trip for a
better illustration and comparison.
It is directly noticeable that the general course of the
deviations between the ECUs is nearly identical. This is also
shown by the statistical evaluation of the signal deviations,
presented in Table II, showing an average correlation of 87 %.
There is no completely different course recognizable at any
time, only the absolute values and the ranges of fluctuation
vary. This can be seen from the maximum difference between
two succeeding frames, which are between 2.08∗10−2 and
3.47∗10−2. But also the differences in the mean of the
deviations e.g. for ECU 4 with 1.49∗10−2 and ECU 5 with
0.78∗10−2 indicate the fluctuation. While stress on the battery
will equally affect the signal characteristics of each ECU, their
different positions in the vehicle and thus on the CAN bus
could have had a greater influence on these variations. Since
the deviations show an approximately similar course without
noticeable differences, it can be assumed that the decisive
TABLE II: Statistical properties of the signal deviations.
Correlation
ECU 0 ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 ECU 4 ECU 5
ECU 0 1 .84 .80 .96 .96 .96
ECU 1 1 .71 .85 .85 .85
ECU 2 1 .81 .81 .81
ECU 3 1 .98 .81
ECU 4 1 .97
ECU 5 1
Statistical Properties (∗10−2)
ECU 0 ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 ECU 4 ECU 5
Mean 0.78 1.00 0.84 1.09 1.49 0.78
Deviation 0.52 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.50
Maximum 3.69 2.54 3.03 3.10 3.12 2.71
Max. diff. 2.31 3.40 2.34 2.93 3.47 2.08
electronic components of a CAN node have an approximately
equal temperature gain. Generally, it is recognizable that the
deviations gradually increase with the duration of a journey,
while they decrease abruptly after standstill phases.
While the signals within the data sets, i.e. from frame 0
to 800 and from 800 to 2,600, have strong similarities in
their course, there is a noticeable difference in between. As
Figure 3 indicates, there occurs the largest signal change of
up to 3.69 %, mainly explainable by the repair measures of
the vehicle between the two sets. If in this case, the ambient
temperature difference from summer to winter would depict
the crucial factor, the signal levels of fully warmed up ECUs
would have risen to a similar level at the end of each trip.
Comparing the measurement starts of the first and the last
parts of the second data set, however, the ambient temperature
cannot be completely neglected, as a very slight rise in
the voltage level is also noticeable with a falling ambient
temperature. This can generally be explained by the increasing
conductivity of electronic components at decreasing temper-
atures. Basically, the analysis on occurring signal deviations
makes apparent that repeating concepts are noticeable, while
within the trips incremental concept drift due to temperature
changes and in between the trips abrupt concept drift owing
to aforementioned standstill phases and repair measures can
be recognized.
c) Temperature Dependency: We have performed a fur-
ther experimental test to verify the assumption that the signal
deviation is temperature-dependent. Two Arduino Unos, each
equipped with two CAN shields, were analyzed with the use
of a Heraeus Vötsch climatic chamber at a temperature range
of -20◦C (-4◦F) up to 60◦C (140◦F). The wiring of the CAN
bus, as well as the probes of the DSO were also in the chamber
during the measurements. The Arduinos were powered by an
external USB power supply. It has to be made clear that the
construction differs a lot from a real vehicle. This applies
not only to the missing bodies and the supply network, but
also very strongly to the actual electronic components. Such
a simple test setup cannot represent a vehicle, but it can show
a general tendency.
TABLE III: Analysis of the temperature correlation.
Correlation
A 0 S 0 A 0 S 1 A 1 S 0 A 1 S 1 Temperature
A 0 S 0 1 .97 .96 .96 -0.90
A 0 S 1 1 .97 .97 -0.95
A 1 S 0 1 .99 -0.92
A 1 S 1 1 1 -0.93
The analysis of the signal deviation, shown in Figure 5, was
performed over a period of 3 1/2 hours, whereas 30 frames
per temperature range are shown for better visualization. The
evaluation confirms the observation of the temperature depen-
dence made during the analysis of the Fiat data. It is clearly
visible both in the illustration and in the correlations, which
are shown in Table III. As the temperature falls, the general
voltage level of the signals increases and thus the difference
deviates into the positive range. With rising temperatures,
the course of signal differences behaves vice versa. What is
noticeable here, however, is that although there are similarities
in the behavior of the shields equipped on the same Arduino,
they do not necessarily have to be stable. More precisely,
while the deviation of the Arduino 1 shields shows a very
similar behavior and course, the Arduino 0 shields have a
greater difference. The correlations between the ECUs also
confirm this observation. While the correlations between the
Arduino 1 shields are 99.43 %, the Arduino 0 shields show the
same correlation as when the shields are compared between the
two Arduinos. From this observation it can be concluded that
a construction of a general model for temperature-dependent
change compensation is rather difficult, since each individual
ECU has a different behavior and would therefore require a
separate measurement in advance.
C. Update Mechanism
During the learning phase of a machine learning approach, a
model is established based on the data of a fixed period in time.
After this establishment phase, it is very likely that the oper-
ating conditions change in the course of deployment due to a
dynamic environment. As discovered in the previous section,
the voltage characteristics are especially affected by external
influences leading to the occurrence of both incremental or
abrupt drift. With the purpose to preserve the performance of
the system during these dynamically changing conditions, the
model has to be adapted accordingly.
To enable a controlled adaption of the outdated model,
the concept drift has to be recognized by the system in the
first place. During the initial model establishment, an average
sender identification probability is determined which is used
as reference for the operating phase of the system. In the
course of operation, the classification probabilities used for
sender identification and intrusion detection are also utilized
for the performance evaluation and are therefore continuously
compared against the initially determined reference. Should it
be the case that the actual sender identification probabilities
deteriorate by a certain degree, the necessity of a model
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update is indicated. By using an appropriate machine learning
approach which is capable of establishing a model with
incrementally available data, like it is the case with Logistic
Regression, a model update can simply be performed with
current training data.
These update frames can either be continuously collected
beforehand during the usual operation of the system in a
bounded update set and immediately be used or can be gath-
ered after the detection, which however delays the adaption
procedure by a certain extent. No matter when the frames are
collected, it is of greater importance to include only trustwor-
thy data into an update procedure. The reason for this is the
fact that the operating environment of the system is rarely a
trustworthy one, where an uncontrolled usage of transmitted
frames for update purposes would enable an adversary to
inject malicious frames into the adaption procedure [27]. This
adversarial sampling would allow the attacker to bypass the
intrusion detection sooner or later. Therefore, only frames
which were classified with a high probability by the system
are considered for an inclusion into the update set.
The aforementioned acquisition of update frames, however,
is only applicable for incrementally changing voltage char-
acteristics. An abrupt change of the voltages, like seen in
between the individual trips in Figure 3, can result in a to
strong alteration of the signal, which can lead to the fact
that no transmitted frame can be classified with a high prob-
ability. This exacerbates the selection of trustworthy frames
for the update set. An option to bypass this issue depicts to
explicitly secure the CAN frames with the goal of ensuring
the authenticity. Only in this way it can be assumed that an
insertion of malicious frames into the update procedure does
not take place. With this intention, the temporary utilization of
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) could be considered.
Although the application of MACs has several drawbacks
in the domain of CAN security, like bandwidth limitations
and the requirement on higher computing capabilities, MACs
depict a viable option to provide trustworthy and labeled
frames, which can be used to update the model and to handle
abrupt voltage changes. The difference in its usage to build a
training set is that the cryptographic measurements are rarely
and not continuously used and there is no need to transfer
real-time critical data. Furthermore, the available bandwidth
is only slightly reduced by event-based messages, and not
during the entire communication. On a 65 % loaded bus at
a baud rate of 500 kb/s roughly 3000 frames/s are transmitted.
By e.g. 16 additional frames per ECU for updating the models,
i.e. a total of 96 frames for the Fiat 500 considered here,
the load of the bus would increase e.g. for one second
by 2.08 %. By the continous application of MACs for the
protection of the communication, the usage of a MAC tag
length of 24 bits and 8 bits for the freshness value would halve
the bandwidth. The resulting load of 130 %, since twice the
amount of frames is necessary, would exceed the maximum,
which is why the continuous use of MAC for the assumed
network is not possible. For this reason, the situational use
compared to the continuous use of MACs represents only a
minor effort. Having updated the system with the most present
and trustworthy data, its classification performance should be
improved to the initial level until the next voltage deterioration
is detected and the respective update procedure initiated.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the different strategies in terms
of performance and robustness. First, we analyze whether a
robust sender identification can be kept up over the entire
training data without having to perform an update. Initially
the models are trained and then used to classify the remaining
frames. Afterwards the update technique is analyzed, as de-
scribed in Section III-C. A model is trained initially, which
is monitored during runtime and updated if necessary. In
order to visualize the performance of the strategies, the course
of four different parameters is presented. The Identification
indicates how many frames could be assigned to the correct
sender. This provides direct information about the general
performance of the sender identification. The values True
Positive and True Negative indicate how the system behaves
when deciding between malicious and trustworthy frames.
For this purpose we have set the lower threshold to 0.2 and
the upper threshold to 0.8. A total of 5 % of the frames
were treated as attacks, which was achieved by adjusting the
identifiers while parsing the frames. The impersonated ECU
has been continuously modified to ensure that each ECU is
counterfeited by each ECU. Finally, the Confidence describes
the general behavior of the model, which consists of all
probabilities of the predictions.
A. Initial Approach
To begin with, a static model is examined which is es-
tablished with a small amount of training data. For this,
the model was initially trained with the first 200 frames
per ECU, as suggested in Scission [17]. Subsequently, the
remaining frames were processed by the system, i.e. the sender
was determined and it was decided whether the frame was
malicious or trustworthy. The performance of this training
approach is shown in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6: Performance at a training size of 200 frames.
Figure 6 shows that the average confidence level of the
model starts to decrease slightly before frame 10,000. This
point marks the transition from the second to the third part
of the first data set, i.e. the shift from the switched-off to the
switched-on vehicle. From this point on, the performance of
the system begins to decrease, especially sharply after frame
22,000. The same applies to the number of true positives,
which means that the chance of sending a counterfeit frame
unnoticed increases. This is due to the deterioration of the
model, indicated by the confidence rate. Due to the low
probability values of the classifiers, it is less common for
an attack to be marked as such, since the upper threshold
for reducing false positives is rarely exceeded. At the same
time, however, it is also apparent that this greatly reduces
the number of false positives. Without the double threshold
technique, the True Negative Rate would be equal to the
Identification Rate, i.e. 91.23 %. It can also be seen that the
first false positives occur after frame 45,000.
B. Increased Training Size
In this configuration it was examined whether a greater
number of frames results in a noticeable improvement of
performance and robustness. Therefore, the model was trained
with the first 1,000 frames per ECU, instead of the first 200
frames, and then used for the evaluation of the remaining
frames. The behavior is illustrated in Figure 7.
The results show that an increased amount of training leads
only to a very slight improvement but not to a sufficiently
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Fig. 7: Performance at a training size of 1000 frames.
good result. Although the false identifications are reduced
by 7.3 % compared to the previous method, the performance
is far behind the general identification rates [17] of 99.85 %.
Essentially, the decrease in performance is shifted by the
additional training frames. What is noticeable, however, is that
the confidence of the model is higher. In particular, the risk of
confusion is about 22 % lower, since the probabilities of those
ECUs, which are not the sender, are lower. This also explains
the increased True Negative Rate, as the probabilities of
normal frames are less likely to be below the lower threshold.
This reduces the number of frames marked as suspicious and
at the same time reduces the chance of being misclassified
as malicious. Identification and True Positive Rate remain
approximately the same. The differences are primarily due to
the low portion of frames of the first data set, since additionally
4,800 frames were used for training. Therefore, we conclude
that an increased number of training frames can enhance the
performance and robustness slightly, but is not sufficient to
deal with major changes.
C. Update Mechanism
Having compared the course of the performance for sender
identification and intrusion detection for a static approach
without an adaptation in the previous sections, we now include
the update mechanism described in Section III-C into the
approach. Here, the basis for the evaluation on the sender
identification with the built in update mechanism is similar
to the one without. Concretely, a model is established on the
basis of a fixed sized training set, in this case containing 200
frames per ECU. If a deterioration of the average probability
is observed, the model is updated with the latest CAN frames.
In concrete terms, when the confidence for an ECU falls
below the upper threshold of 0.8, an update is initiated. For a
single model update we have used 16 frames per ECU. This
procedure is performed for the remaining test frames of the
available data sets. The results are shown in Figure 8.
The rates show the same slight performance decrease after
frame 10,000. At this point the chance to send a faked frame
unnoticeably increases. However, it is important to note here
that the scale of the figure is significantly smaller than in
the previous sections. Since the confidence of the individual
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Fig. 8: Performance using the update mechanism.
classifiers is continuously monitored, the system recognizes its
decrease and can thus react with targeted updates of individual
classifiers. In Figure 8, the first classifier is updated at frame
16,097, which results in an immediate increase in performance.
After changing the data set at frame 22,000 from summer to
winter, another update of the classifiers is necessary. At this
point, MACs have to be used for the acquisition of reliable
learning material, since after the four-month break and repair,
a sufficiently high probability of classification could no longer
be achieved. In concrete terms, this means that the confidence
for the appropriate frames did not reach the upper threshold.
Without the use of MACs, it cannot be ensured that the frames
used to adapt the model are not manipulated. Without this
guarantee, poisoning attacks would be possible. Alternatively,
a targeted update of the system could be carried out in the
workshop after the repair. Nonetheless, after updating the
model, it is visible that the overall performance of the system
increases and that a high detection and identification rate can
be achieved. We could prevent all false positives and achieved
a high classification probability of 99.98 %. A large part of
the undetected malicious frames are unnoticed as they were
present exactly at the moment of the data set change, i.e. the
time of a decreasing classification accuracy. If these frames
can be labelled e.g. after a longer standstill using MACs,
they can also be prevented and the True Positive Rate further
increased. Basically, it can also be seen here that an initial
training to classify all frames of the large winter data set would
be sufficient to determine all ECUs correctly without another
update. This is also confirmed by the results, if the experiment
from Section IV-A is only performed with the winter data set.
D. Randomized Training Set
It is common to use shuffled data for the evaluation of
machine learning applications [28], which is however difficult
to implement for this technology. Therefore, Scission uses the
first frames per ECU on the bus. In order to understand the
consequences of this restriction, we additionally investigate
the behavior when 200 randomly selected frames are used per
ECU to train the model. The remaining frames stay in the
order they were measured on the bus. The results are shown
in Figure 9.
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To get rid of random noise, we repeated this test 20
times. Basically, the results were comparable in every run,
the Confidence Rate falls slightly at frame 15,000. This range
contains the largest deviation of the signal as well as a few
outliers, which corresponds to the range 500-600 in Figure 3.
For the True Negative Rate there are no deviations, i.e. no
false alarms occurred. For the Identification and True Positive
Rate there are minimal differences, as there are five runs of
one false negative each. This false estimation also occurs in
the area with the largest deviations. Overall, an average false
negative probability of 0.00125 % was achieved.
E. Parallel Measuring
In Scission [17] it is mentioned that a mutual validation can
be used to increase the reliability if the bus is observed from
different measuring points. In order to achieve a real advantage
by monitoring the bus in parallel, the two models must have a
certain difference. Since the topology has an influence on the
signal characteristics and the measuring point is also a part of
this, its positioning also has an effect on the characteristics.
In order to investigate this fact we made another measurement
trip. We recorded 9,985 frames parallely at two points, the
OBD-II port and a direct access in the trunk of the vehicle.
By using several channels of the DSOs it was ensured that
the identical frames were recorded. It can be seen directly
from the signals that the different measuring points contribute
to the distinguishability of the characteristic. The differences
are noticeable in the shape of the edges. In Figure 10, the
differences are shown exemplarily for one frame.
A model with 200 frames was trained for both data sets
to see if we can increase the robustness of the system.
Subsequently, the remaining frames of the two instances were
analyzed. During the two evaluations the frames were exactly
the same, only the measuring point was different. The results
are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12. With identifcation rates
of over 99.9 % and thus comparable with the results specified
in Scission [17], the performance is in principle comparably
good for both measureing points. Nevertheless, it is noticeable
that the model, which was trained with the recordings from
the trunk of the vehicle, did not recognize two manipulated
frames. However, the model which was trained with the
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measurements on the OBD-II port recognizes all manipulated
frames. As well as making the system more reliable to detect
attacks, it also allows false positives to be double-checked to
further reduce the chance of a false alarm. Consequently, the
statement that the reliability of sender identification systems
can be increased by multiple verification at different measuring
points is demonstrated and can thus be confirmed.
F. Strategy Summary
Fundamentally, we have shown that targeted strategies can
greatly increase the performance and robustness of sender
identification. The tests confirmed the already recommended
training size of 200 frames per ECU. An increased number
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does not achieve any significant improvements (see Figure 6
and Figure 7), but increases the effort for the training in terms
of time, computing capacity and memory consumption. Here,
the utilization of an update mechanism provides advantages,
but causes a further problem, since a secure training set
cannot be set up with insufficient identification confidence.
The danger of poisoning attacks increases, hence the use
of e.g. MACs in order to create a labelled update set or
training in a safe environment is necessary. On the other
hand, the performance is surprising when the model is trained
with randomly selected frames (see Figure 9). The results
even exceed those of the update mechanism. However, the
implementation is difficult in practice, as the data per vehicle
would have to be collected over several months. But here,
too, the secure labelling of the data must be guaranteed. A
combination is therefore considered to be appropriate. Initially,
the model can be trained with the first 200 frames per ECU.
For large changes, frames secured with MACs are sent, which
are used to update the model. At the same time, a long-term
training set can be set up in order to achieve the best possible
general representation. This set can then be used to replace
the initial model.
V. RELATED WORK
During the operation of sender identification systems, dif-
ferent concept drifts occur as shown in Section III-B. During
a trip, mainly incremental drifts are observed, whereas in
between there are abrupt or recurring drifts. Basically, there
are different strategies [26] for handling these. However, due to
the limited resources of the targeted hardware, these cannot be
easily applied. At the same time, the authenticity of learning
material is of particular importance, as otherwise poisoning
attacks are possible.
Even though Murvay and Groza [18] could not detect any
concept drift in their prototype structure during a period of
a few months, they note that these may occur and can be
counteracted by continuously updating the model. The work
of Choi et al. [20] contains no statements on a potential
concept drift, whereas in the further development [21] this
is specifically analyzed. The researchers examined a real
vehicle on two days with a temperature difference of 10◦C
(50◦F). The analyses support our observations that, among
other things, temperature has an influence on the signals. As
a countermeasure, incremental learning is used here, which
made it possible to maintain performance to a certain extent.
However, there is a lack of research and information on how
poisoning attacks can be prevented and how abrupt drifts can
be handled in general. In addition, incremental learning is very
computation intensive, since each frame is used to update the
model.
Viden [29] does not use the entire signal for sender identifi-
cation, but only the voltage level of high signals (e.g. sample
15 in Figure 4b). In principle, this approach also continuously
updates the model to compensate incremental changes. This
process is suspended when an attack is detected in order to
prevent poisoning. This requires an intact classification of the
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Fig. 13: Signal deviations of the stable high signal for all ECUs.
ECUs and therefore cannot be used for abrupt changes. For
these, Viden provides a common adaptation of the voltage
profiles of all ECUs, since a similar voltage drop could be
observed during a measurement. Even if this worked in their
presented evaluation, the results here (see Section III-B0b)
show that the signal changes are not equal across all ECUs.
This becomes even clearer if the deviations are not considered
for the rising edge but for the stable high signal. As it can be
clearly seen in Figure 13, the deviations are different. While
the deviations for ECUs 0, 1, 2 and 5 are between frame
2,400 and 2,600 at a maximum of 0.6 %, the deviations for
ECU 3 are between 0.6 % and 1.4 % and for ECU 4 between
1.5 % and 2.4 %. A common adjustment of the voltage profiles
can therefore lead to incorrect models, which means that
the senders can no longer be reliably identified and hence
poisoning of the model cannot be prevented.
VI. CONCLUSION
Changes in analog signals need to be considered when used
for sender identification. In our investigations, deviations of
more than 3 % could be observed, characterized by incremen-
tal, abrupt and recurring changes of the signal characteristics,
i.e. concept drifts. In particular, a targeted experiment in
a climatic chamber was able to demonstrate a high degree
of temperature dependence. By observing the performance
of the sender identification methods, these changes can be
detected and handled using an updating procedure. Our up-
dating procedure maintains general performance even with
major changes in the operating conditions of the examined
vehicle. Furthermore, with a long term update strategy, this
work gives a recommendation for a continuously high system
performance. Our elaboration was also the first to examine
the signal changes in greater detail and to use real data
recorded over a longer period of time. Together with the
update procedure, this work closes the gap between sender
identification procedures on the CAN and its robust operation.
In summary, an identification rate and attack detection of over
99 %, as well as the avoidance of all false alarms could be
achieved and shows for the first time that the operation of the
technology is also possible with long-term signal changes.
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